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Juvenile Life Without Parole
kAllee spooner
The purpose of this paper is to analyze data, policy trends, and legal concerns on the issue of sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).  Policy changes in the 1980s and 90s dramatically changed the sentencing outcomes for juvenile offenders. 
Significantly departing from the rehabilitative goals established by the juvenile 
court, states adopted harsher punishments, including LWOP.  During this 
shift, the diminished culpability of youth became insignificant when compared 
to the nature of their crimes.  The recent cases of Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
and Graham v. Florida (2010) reinstated the importance of recognizing that 
juveniles are different from adults, and accordingly should not be subjected to the 
same punishments.  In light of these decisions, the constitutionality of sentencing 
juveniles to LWOP will be addressed. 
Policy Trends and Data
Punitive sentencing trends initiated during the late twentieth century have 
resulted in an increased application of the sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders.  From 1962 to 1981, 
an average of two juvenile offenders received LWOP sentences each year 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008).  Beginning in 1982, annual increases were 
reported, peaking at 152 youth in 1996 (Human Rights Watch, 2008). 
Although crime rates have declined since 1994, it is estimated that the rate 
at which states sentence youth to LWOP is three times higher than it was in 
1992 (Hechinger, 2011).  Human Rights Watch (2010) reports that 2,574 
individuals are currently serving LWOP for crimes they committed when 
they were under the age of eighteen.
Today, the United States is the only country in the world that actively sentences 
juveniles to LWOP (Human Rights Watch, 2008).  LWOP conflicts with 
provisions of international law, including Article 37 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) that prohibits life sentences 
for juveniles.  Contrary to global law and practice, forty-four states and the 
federal government permit juvenile LWOP (Koppel, 2010).  All of these states 
impose LWOP on a mandatory or presumptive basis for certain offenses (e.g. 
first-degree murder) (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
The following table 5.1 breaks down the number of youth serving LWOP 
by state.  California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have the 
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largest number of youth sentenced to LWOP.  More than half 
of all the juveniles sentenced to LWOP are in these five states.
juveniles (59%) sentenced to LWOP are first-time offenders 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008).  Twenty-six percent of juveniles 
sentenced to LWOP were convicted of felony murder.  Felony 
murder is charged when a youth participated in a robbery or 
burglary while a co-participant committed murder, without 
the knowledge or intent of the youth (Human Rights Watch, 
2008).  Sentencing juveniles to LWOP for felony murder 
seems particularly harsh considering their inability to foresee 
long-term consequences of their actions, and their increased 
susceptibility to peer pressure.   
The data also suggests that there may be gender and racial 
biases in juvenile LWOP sentencing.  Males comprise the 
majority of the juvenile LWOP population.  For example, in 
Massachusetts, all of the youth sentenced to LWOP are males 
(Monahon, 2009).  In Michigan, 98% of juvenile LWOP 
inmates are male and only 2% are female (LaBelle, Phillips, & 
Horton, 2004).   
The evidence also shows that Black youth are disproportionately 
sentenced to LWOP when compared to White youth.  Black 
youth are sentenced to LWOP at a rate of ten times that of 
white youth (Human Rights Watch, 2008).  In addition, 
Human Rights Watch (2008) found that Black youth 
arrested for murder were sentenced to LWOP at a rate of 1.59 
times that of White youth.  Although Black offenders are 
disproportionately a part of both the adult and juvenile justice 
systems, issues of racial bias deserve additional consideration in 
LWOP sentencing. 
The sentence of LWOP is particularly harsh for juveniles given 
their vulnerability in adult correctional facilities.  According 
to Monahon (2009), juveniles are vulnerable because of their 
size, lack of experience in the system, and lack of peer support 
groups.  Compared to youth in juvenile facilities, juveniles 
incarcerated in adult prisons are five times more likely to be 
sexually assaulted, and almost twice as likely to be attacked with 
a weapon by inmates or beaten by staff (Redding, 2010).  In 
order to protect themselves from physical violence, including 
rape, many youth engage in fights in prison (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008).     
The sentence of LWOP communicates to youth that they are 
irredeemable and can never reenter society.  LWOP inmates 
may obtain release via sentence commutation or pardon, 
however this rarely occurs (Leigey, 2010).  With little hope of 
release, juveniles sentenced to LWOP are at risk of self-harm 
and suicide (Human Rights Watch, 2008).  Juveniles in adult 
facilities are eight times more likely to commit suicide than 
youth in juvenile facilities (Redding, 2010).  In addition, 
juveniles sentenced to LWOP often lose important family and 
TABLE 5.1
 State # of Juveniles State # of Juveniles  
  Sentenced   Sentenced
  to LWOP  to LWOP
 Alabama 62 Montana 1
 Alaska No LWOP Nebraska 24
 Arizona 32 Nevada 16
 Arkansas 73 New Hampshire 3
 California 250 New Jersey 0
 Colorado 48 New Mexico No LWOP
 Connecticut 9 New York 0
 Delaware 7 North Carolina 44
 District of Columbia No LWOP North Dakota 1
 Florida 266 Ohio 2
 Georgia 8 Oklahoma 48
 Hawaii 4 Oregon No LWOP
 Idaho 4 Pennsylvania 444
 Illinois 103 Rhode Island 2
 Indiana 2 South Carolina 26
 Iowa 44 South Dakota 9
 Kansas No LWOP Tennessee 4
 Kentucky 5 Texas 5
 Louisiana 335 Utah 1
 Maine 0 Vermont 0
 Maryland 13 Virginia 48
 Massachusetts 57 Washington 28
 Michigan 346 West Virginia 0
 Minnesota 2 Wisconsin 16
 Mississippi 24 Wyoming 6
 Missouri 116 Federal 36
Source: Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth (2009). http://
www.endjlwop.org/the-issue/stats-by-state/
Proponents of juvenile LWOP argue that the sentence is 
applied sparingly as it is reserved for chronic and violent 
offenders.  From 1980-2008, juvenile offenders committed 
44,357 homicides, yet there are only 2,445 juveniles serving 
LWOP for homicide offenses (Puzzanchera & Kang, 2010). 
This means that less than six percent of juvenile homicide 
offenders were sentenced to LWOP.  These numbers suggest 
that the sentence of LWOP has been sparingly applied to 
juvenile homicide offenders.  
However, contrary to proponents’ beliefs, juvenile LWOP is 
not only reserved for the worst of the worst.  The majority of 
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pro-social bonds (Butler, 2010).  For example, they can be 
incarcerated in an institution that is far from their family and 
some prison policies limit phone calls, thus inhibiting visits 
and communication.  Pro-social ties and support help inmates 
adjust to prison life (Rocque, Bierie, & MacKenzie, 2010). 
Loss of supportive family members could contribute to their 
sense of hopelessness.  
Leigey (2010) conducted a study addressing the mental health 
of inmates sentenced to LWOP.  Using data from a 2004 
survey of inmates in state and federal correctional facilities as 
well as conducting interviews with twenty-five LWOP inmates 
in a mid-Atlantic state, Leigey found that the initial stages of 
incarceration are particularly stressful (Leigey, 2010).  This is 
evidenced by the higher likelihood of reported mental illness 
among LWOP inmates who had served less than ten and a half 
years.  Respondents reported improved mental health over the 
course of their incarceration, attributing their mental wellness 
to a positive outlook and hope of release.  Further, the study 
found that most inmates did not rely on mental health services 
to help them adjust to prison life.  A small subset of respondents 
reported a smoother transition to prison life because they had 
already served time prior to their LWOP sentence.  However, 
these inmates admitted that adjusting to a LWOP sentence is 
different than adjusting to a shorter sentence (Leigey, 2010).  
Although this sample did not include inmates who were 
sentenced to LWOP as juveniles, it provides an outlook on the 
challenges that juveniles may face in adult correctional facilities. 
Given the vulnerability of youth in adult prisons, it is likely 
that they will experience an increased risk of mental health 
issues during the initial stages of their sentence.  Additionally, 
while the sample size is relatively small, this study provides 
meaningful qualitative data on the mental state of inmates 
sentenced to LWOP.  
Since individuals serving LWOP are not likely to be released, it 
is extremely difficult for them to gain entrance to educational or 
skill-building programs in prison.  Monahon (2009) suggested 
that this is because individuals serving LWOP are not seen as 
needing to learn or develop skills since they will never be free 
again.  Unfortunately, juveniles sentenced to LWOP are denied 
opportunities to develop and reform at a time in their life when 
they most need it.
Sentencing individuals to LWOP assumes that they will be a 
danger to society for the remainder of their lives.  Contrary 
to this assumption, recidivism rates are low among older 
inmates, including individuals serving life who are released 
(Nellis, 2010).  Mauer, King, and Young (2004) reported that 
four out of five individuals serving life who were released in 
1994 were not arrested for a new crime three years after their 
release.  Whereas only one third of all offenders released from 
prison were not arrested within three years of release.  These 
figures suggest that with age, most offenders become less of a 
danger to society.  Research about LWOP sentencing is critical 
in determining effectiveness and constitutionality.  With a 
comprehensive understanding of relevant data, this paper will 
now explore the legal issues of sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
Legal issues of Juvenile LwoP
In Graham v. Florida (2010), the majority of the Supreme 
Court ruled in a 6-to-3 vote that sentencing juveniles to 
LWOP for non-homicide offenses was a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, and thus 
unconstitutional.  This ruling did not require states to release 
juvenile non-homicide offenders, but states must afford these 
offenders meaningful opportunity to get parole based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation (Graham v. Florida, 
2010).  Graham applied to the 129 prisoners serving LWOP 
for non-homicide crimes committed as juveniles (Hechinger, 
2011).  
Prior to the Graham decision, the Supreme Court had 
established two tests, one for capital cases and the other for 
noncapital cases, to determine if the Eighth Amendment’s cruel 
and unusual punishments clause had been violated.  Capital 
cases employed a categorical approach, whereas noncapital 
cases used a balancing test.  In Graham, the Supreme Court 
applied the categorical approach to a noncapital case, departing 
from previously established procedures.
supreme Court Procedures to Determine the 
Constitutionality of Punishment in Capital and 
Noncapital Cases
In capital cases, the court requires a two-step test to decide 
whether certain categories of offenders or offenses should be 
excluded from the death penalty (Siegler & Sullivan, 2011). 
At step one, the court determines whether there is a national 
consensus against the death penalty.  To do this, the court looks 
at the number of jurisdictions that allow the death penalty 
and how often it is imposed for a particular offense or class of 
offender.  
At step two, the court makes an “independent judgment” 
on whether the death penalty for a certain crime or class of 
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment (Roper v. Simmons, 
2005).  In this analysis, the court weighs the nature of the 
offense and the culpability of the offender against the severity 
of the punishment.  The court also considers the penological 
justifications for the death penalty (i.e. retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation).  Additionally, the court 
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takes into account any international consensus against the 
punishment as an instructive means to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).
In noncapital cases, the court applies a balancing test on a 
case-by-case basis.  The balancing test is used to determine 
whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the 
crime committed (Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).  The balancing 
test consists of two stages.  
At stage one, the court determines whether the defendant has 
established “an inference of gross disproportionality” (Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 1991).  In this analysis, the court weighs the nature 
of the offense and the culpability of the offender against the 
type of sentence imposed.  For example, the court might rule 
disproportionate a first-time juvenile drug offender sentenced 
to 50 years in prison.  In the rare case that the defendant proves 
gross disproportionality, the court then moves to stage two 
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).  
At stage two, the court considers sentences imposed on other 
offenders in the same jurisdiction and sentences imposed for 
the same crime in other jurisdictions (Solem v. Helm, 1983). 
In these analyses, the court looks at both the legislatively 
permitted sentences and the actual sentencing outcomes 
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011). 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence in Graham v. Florida 
In Graham v. Florida (2010), the Supreme Court used the 
categorical approach to come to their decision.  First, the 
court determined that there was a national consensus against 
sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to LWOP.  Thirty-
seven states and the federal government allowed LWOP for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders, however the sentence was 
used infrequently.  Florida accounted for 77 of the 109 juvenile 
non-homicide offenders serving LWOP in 2010 (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2010).  The remaining 52 
were incarcerated in just ten states and the federal system 
(Graham v. Florida, 2010).  These figures demonstrated that 
youth were disproportionately sentenced to LWOP in a small 
number of states.
Second, the majority made an “independent judgment” that 
LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  In this analysis, the court weighed the nature of 
the offense and culpability of the offenders against the severity 
of the sentence, considered the penological justifications, and 
took into account international law and practice.  
Although non-homicide offenses can be quite violent, they are 
different from murder in severity and irrevocability.  Life is 
taken from the victim of a murderer, but the victim of a non-
homicide crime still has a chance to live.  Writing the majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy argued, “the court has recognized 
that defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that 
life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most 
serious forms of punishment than are murderers” (Graham v. 
Florida, 2010).  
Considering the culpability of juveniles, Justice Kennedy 
referred to Roper v. Simmons (2005).  In Roper v. Simmons 
(2005) the court held in a 5-to-4 vote that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments categorically prohibit capital 
punishment for offenders who were under eighteen when they 
committed the offense.  The majority in Roper cited scientific 
and sociological studies on the salient characteristics of juveniles 
that distinguished them from adults.  The court recognized 
that juveniles lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, are vulnerable to negative influences (e.g. peer 
pressure), and have not developed fixed characteristics (Roper 
v. Simmons, 2005).  
Further demonstrating the differences in culpability between 
youth and adults, Justice Kennedy alluded to developments in 
psychology and brain science.  The research in these fields has 
shown that juveniles are more capable of change because parts 
of the brain involved in behavior control continue to develop 
through late adolescence.  Justice Kennedy wrote, “because 
juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments” (Graham v. Florida, 2010).  
  Regarding the severity of the sentence, Justice Kennedy 
recognized that LWOP is not the same as the death penalty, 
yet both sentences share characteristics.  Both sentences are 
irrevocable.  In both sentences, those convicted have no hope 
for restoration, except in the case of an executive clemency, the 
possibility of which does not make the sentence any less harsh. 
Both sentences communicate to convicted offenders that they 
are irredeemable, incapable of change, and will never be fit to 
reenter society (Graham v. Florida, 2010).  
Justice Kennedy maintained, “life without parole is an especially 
harsh punishment for a juvenile” (Graham v. Florida, 2010). 
Juveniles will serve on average more time than adults sentenced 
to LWOP, making the sentence disproportionately longer for 
youth.  A minor sentenced to LWOP will serve virtually his 
or her entire life in ignominious confinement (Brief amicus 
curiae of the Juvenile Law Center in Graham v. Florida, 2009). 
The juvenile sentenced to LWOP will never experience free 
adulthood (Brief amicus curiae of the American Psychological 
Association in Graham v. Florida, 2009).  
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Additionally, the Justice Kennedy determined, “none of the 
goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate 
– retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 
– provide an adequate justification” for sentencing juvenile 
non-homicide offenders to LWOP (Graham v. Florida, 2010). 
The purposes of retribution are to express society’s moral 
condemnation of a crime and to seek restoration of the moral 
imbalance.  Roper established that “retribution is not as strong 
with a minor as with an adult” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). 
Justice Kennedy argued that retribution does not justify 
sentencing juveniles to such a harsh punishment given their 
diminished culpability (Graham v. Florida, 2010).  
Furthermore, the majority found that deterrence does not 
justify LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders because 
juveniles are less likely than adults to be discouraged from 
committing crime.  This is because juveniles are less capable 
than adults to consider the long-term consequences of their 
actions.  When compared to adults, youth are less likely to 
think about possible punishments when they decide to commit 
crimes (Graham v. Florida, 2010).   
The purpose of incapacitation is to ensure public safety 
by keeping those at high risk to reoffend off the streets. 
Incapacitation does not justify sentencing juvenile non-
homicide offenders to LWOP because if the offender can 
be rehabilitated, then there is no need to incapacitate that 
offender.  Justice Kennedy argued, “a life without parole 
sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to 
demonstrate change and maturity” (Graham v. Florida, 2010). 
Although a youth may seem at high risk of harming others 
upon conviction, LWOP erroneously assumes that the youth 
will always be a high risk.  Considering the transient nature of 
youthfulness, it is wrong to presuppose that a juvenile offender 
will not change.  
Lastly, the majority determined that rehabilitation does not 
justify LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders because 
the sentence of LWOP denies youthful offenders the right 
to reenter society.  A sentence of LWOP communicates that 
the juvenile offender is irredeemable.  This judgment is not 
warranted given the capacity of youth to change and their 
diminished moral culpability.  Further, rehabilitation is not 
accomplished by this sentence because individuals sentenced 
to LWOP are often denied access to rehabilitative services (e.g. 
vocational training, education).  The denial of rehabilitative 
services and treatment makes LWOP for juveniles especially 
severe considering their receptivity and need for rehabilitation 
(Graham v. Florida, 2010).     
After the majority considered the penological justifications, it 
then took into account international law and practice.  Justice 
Kennedy noted that the United States is the only nation that 
actively imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile non-homicide 
offenders (Graham v. Florida, 2010).  Outside of the United 
States, only ten countries allow LWOP for juveniles.  Only 
Israel imposes this sentence currently, and in Israel there are 
only seven prisoners serving LWOP for crimes committed 
as juveniles (De La Vega & Leighton, 2008).  The majority 
considered international consensus as instructive in making 
this decision.  
Significant Departure from Previous Jurisprudence
In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated, “for the first time in its 
history, the court declares an entire class of offenders immune 
from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it 
had previously reserved for death penalty cases alone” (Graham 
v. Florida, 2010).  The majority offered three justifications 
for using the categorical approach, instead of the case-by-
case approach, in the case of juveniles facing LWOP for non-
homicide crimes. 
In their first justification, the majority referred to the general 
proposition in Roper that juveniles are categorically less 
culpable and more capable of reform than adult offenders. 
The majority argued that sentencing authorities lack the means 
to sufficiently identify the few persistent juvenile offenders 
who might deserve the harshest penalty available (Siegler & 
Sullivan, 2011).  The second justification was that the case-
by-case approach does not take into account the difficulties 
of counsel in representation.  Juveniles are generally less able 
than adults to assist their counsel, resulting in an impairment 
of the quality of defense.  The psychological immaturity of 
youth impacts the way in which they perceive legal processes 
and make choices.  Adolescents tend to focus on short-term 
consequences because they lack the ability to think about long-
term outcomes.  This deficit in decision-making faculties could 
lead them to make adjudicative decisions (e.g. waive rights, 
plea bargain) that they would not make as a reasonable adult 
(Grisso & Schwartz, 2000).  The third justification was that 
the “categorical rule gives all juvenile non-homicide offenders 
a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform” (Graham v. 
Florida, 2010).  
The court chose to use the categorical rule because the case-
by-case approach would most likely lead to the imposition of 
LWOP on juvenile offenders who are not culpable enough to 
deserve it or who are capable of maturation and rehabilitation 
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).  Some juvenile non-homicide 
offenders may be seen as deserving the harshest available 
punishment, however most deserve a second chance.  Before 
Graham, it was nearly impossible for juvenile offenders in non-
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homicide cases to prove their sentences unconstitutional.  In 
fact, under the balancing test only a handful of defendants 
won relief at the state and federal appellate court level (Siegler 
& Sullivan, 2011).  Thus, the Supreme Court applied the 
categorical rule in order to protect less culpable juvenile non-
homicide offenders from disproportionate sentences.  
Application to Juvenile Homicide Offenders
Graham applied to the 129 individuals sentenced to LWOP 
for non-homicide crimes committed as juveniles.  Juvenile 
non-homicide offenders represented a fraction of the entire 
population of youth sentenced to LWOP.  It is estimated 
that there are 2,445 individuals currently serving LWOP for 
homicide offenses committed as juveniles (Human Rights 
Watch, 2010).  If the Supreme Court were to determine the 
constitutionality of sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to 
LWOP, the court would have to (1) consider whether there 
is a national consensus against the sentence, and (2) make 
an “independent judgment” on whether LWOP for juvenile 
homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.  
There are objective indicators of a national consensus against 
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP.  Of the 
forty-four states that allow LWOP for juvenile homicide 
offenders, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia 
have ten or fewer individuals serving LWOP for committing 
homicide as juveniles.  Only seven states have one hundred 
or more individuals serving LWOP for crimes committed as 
juveniles (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010). 
This suggests that a minority of states are disproportionately 
sentencing youth to LWOP. 
In making an “independent judgment” on whether LWOP for 
juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment, 
the court would weigh the nature of the offense and culpability 
of the offenders against the severity of the sentence, consider the 
penological justifications, and take into account international 
law and practice.  Roper and Graham both support the 
proposition that juveniles are categorically less culpable.  The 
majority in Graham made a distinction between the nature of 
homicide and non-homicide offenses.  It is important to note, 
however, that in Graham the majority was concerned that initial 
decision makers might give too much weight to the seriousness 
of the offense and not enough to the reduced culpability of 
the offender, resulting in many juveniles sentenced to LWOP 
who arguably do not deserve such a harsh sentence (Siegler & 
Sullivan, 2011).  
In addition, a case could be made that sentencing juvenile 
homicide offenders to LWOP does not meet the defined 
penological justifications.  All of the rejections of the 
penological goals found in Graham could be applied to juvenile 
homicide offenders.  Considering youth’s inherent capacity to 
change and their diminished moral culpability, none of the 
penological goals justify sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
Furthermore, the international consensus against sentencing 
juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP should be noted.  For 
example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), ratified by the United States in 1992, 
demands that no one should be subject to cruel or inhumane 
punishments, that juveniles must be separated from adults in 
correctional facilities, and that sentencing authorities should 
promote rehabilitation for juvenile offenders.  Although the 
United States reserves the right to treat juveniles as adults in 
exceptional circumstances, the number of youth transferred to 
adult court and sentenced to adult punishments suggests that 
the United States has abused this right (Hechinger, 2011).  
Additionally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
prohibits LWOP for juvenile offenders (CRC, 1990).  Every 
self-governing nation in the world has both signed and ratified 
the CRC.  Only the United States and Somalia have failed to 
ratify the CRC (Hechinger, 2011).  Furthermore, in 2007 the 
United Nations General Assembly called for the abolition of 
LWOP for juveniles.  Out of 184 parties, the United States 
was the only dissenter (Hechinger, 2011).  An international 
consensus against sentencing juveniles to LWOP is instructive 
in determining the constitutionality of the sentence.        
In the 2011 term, the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments 
for two cases dealing with the sentence of LWOP for juvenile 
homicide offenders.  The court will hear these two cases in 
March 2012 and render a decision likely by the end of June 
2012.  In the first case, Jackson v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court 
will consider the constitutionality of (1) sentencing a 14-year-
old convicted of felony murder to LWOP, and (2) mandatory 
sentencing schemes that necessarily result in juvenile LWOP. 
In the second case, Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court will 
determine whether sentencing a 14-year-old to LWOP violates 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment.  In these cases, the Supreme Court 
will focus on the specific age group of 13 to 14 year olds.  It 
is not clear how the court will rule.  The court may abolish 
the sentence completely or in limited circumstances (e.g. 
mandatory sentences, felony murder), or conclude that LWOP 
for 13- and 14-year-old homicide offenders is constitutional.
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that sentencing 
juveniles to LWOP is unconstitutional.  Recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in Roper and Graham has established that 
juveniles are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation 
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than adults, and thus they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.  Sentencing juveniles to LWOP disregards these 
developmental differences and treats youth like fully responsible 
adults.  Criminals should be held responsible for their crimes, 
but not at the expense of constitutional rights.    
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